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Abstract 
This article investigates uncertainties in global sourcing and outsourcing. The empirical research 
design is a multiple-case study that captures the uncertainties that companies face when sourcing 
low-cost countries (LCC) and when outsourcing to supplier markets that are in close proximity, but are 
non-developed. This article finds that, regardless of whether companies source to LCC or outsource to 
nearby suppliers, they face the problem of suppliers not having experience with the operations they 
run.Under such circumstances, operational uncertainties come into focus, particularly in the absence 
of a well-functioning supplier market. For practitioners, it is important to consider that a company 
must mitigate or manage uncertainties when it does not have a given supplier partner. The present 
study has found that mixed strategies, in which parallel production is continued in-house whilst also 
outsourcing, are a particularly effective way of managing multiples of uncertainties.  
Keywords 




Many companies that have initialised sourcing or outsourcing programmes have not analysed the 
consequences of the uncertainties to which they are subjected (Rehme et al., 2013). For instance, 
experiences from various industries indicate that many outsourcing decisions have been based on a 
crude “core competence” or balance-sheet analysis (Lonsdale & Cox, 1997; Lonsdale, 1999; McIvor, 
2008; Dabhilkar et al., 2009). The outcome of outsourcing and low-cost country (LCC) sourcing 
strategies, in terms of performance improvements, has also been increasingly questioned and is one of 
the issues that can be linked to the increased uncertainty (Gilley & Rasheed, 2000; Doig et al., 2001; 
Dabhilkar & Bengtsson, 2008; Cagliano et al., 2012; Horn et al., 2013).  
Regardless of the mixed outcome, firms have comprehensively applied outsourcing and LCC sourcing 
over the last three decades in the IT, automotive and high-tech industries, among others (Willcocks & 
Lacity, 1998; Lonsdale & Cox, 1997; Kern et al., 2002; McIvor et al., 2010; Chicksand et al., 2012; 
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Cagliano et al., 2012; Najafi et al., 2013). As a result of firms applying “me too” outsourcing strategies, 
new sub-sectors with new types of suppliers have been developed (Harland et al., 2005). However, not 
all contexts have a long history of sourcing with existing developed supplier markets (cf. Rehme et al., 
2013). For instance, the supplier market may malfunction before it has developed properly. Instead of 
requiring a few dominant suppliers in the market (something common to several industries), this 
scenario relates to difficulty finding suppliers with developed production systems and experience 
(Walker et al., 2005; Brege, Brehmer, & Rehme, 2008; Brege et al., 2012; Rehme et al., 2013). If there 
are no available firms and the driving force for outsourcing or sourcing is strong enough, the company 
must develop suppliers by transferring in-house skills to the existing supplier base. However, the 
literature has not extensively addressed the uncertainties that may arise or how to mitigate or manage 
uncertainty in the absence of a developed supplier market (Cagliano et al., 2012; Rehme et al., 2013).  
The present study addresses this issue by investigating uncertainty in LCC sourcing and outsourcing to 
supplier markets that are in close proximity, but are non-developed (defined as those markets in which 
there are difficulties finding suppliers with developed production systems and experience of the 
components being considered for outsourcing or LCC sourcing (cf. Rehme et al, 2013). Our study 
draws on the work of Rehme et al. (2013) and focuses specifically on uncertainty in terms of type, 
origin and mitigation or management. The core of the article is based on a series of case studies that 
capture the uncertainties faced by companies when outsourcing in a non-developed supplier market in 
close proximity compared with those companies are confronted with when conducting global sourcing 
from emerging low-cost countries.  
The article makes a distinct contribution to the more general field of purchasing and supply 
management. Through a series of cases studies, we illustrate how firms mitigate or manage uncertainty 
when outsourcing and sourcing in non-developed and emerging supplier markets. The extant 
outsourcing research has tended to address uncertainty in terms of opportunism risks caused by a 
situation of one or a few dominating suppliers (Walker, 1988; Hollcomb & Hitt, 2007; McIvor, 2008). 
The present article helps increase the understanding of operational aspects of LCC sourcing and 
outsourcing situations vis-à-vis the strategic level, which generally handles uncertainties based on 
opportunistic behaviour. This area has been identified in the literature as an area for future research 
(Momme & Hvolby, 2002; Marshall et al., 2007; Boulaksil & Fransoo, 2010; Rehme et al., 2013). 
Finally, our article contributes to the literature by identifying examples of how firms can mitigate 
uncertainty in outsourcing and LCC sourcing situations. 
The next section reviews the literature in the area of uncertainty. We then explain our research 
methodology, followed by six case descriptions. The paper ends by offering some conclusions, 
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2. Literature Review 
Uncertainty can be defined as the inability to predict an individual’s actions as a result of (a) limited 
competence, trustworthiness or reliability of human agents (otherwise known as the principal agent 
problem); (b) market changes; or (c) a buyer’s future requirements (Shelanski & Klein, 1995). When 
complex contractual circumstances involve innovation or the formation of new ventures, transactions 
are likely to include a high degree of uncertainty (Lonsdale, 2005). For instance, uncertainty can 
include lock-in risk when outsourcing, at which point a shift of power can occur in favour of the 
supplier (Lonsdale & Cox, 1997; Lonsdale, 2001; Cox et al., 2003). Therefore, in order to mitigate the 
potential for opportunism, a greater number of safeguards must be written into the contract (Williamson, 
1985, 1991). However, when uncertainty increases, it also becomes more difficult to write contracts, 
which means that producing a component in-house can become more attractive (Williamson, 1985). 
Before discussing uncertainty in more detail, it is necessary to make a distinction between uncertainty 
and risk. The first to do this was Knight (1921), who wrote: 
“... It will appear that a measurable uncertainty, or ‘risk’ proper, as we shall use the term, is so far 
different from an unmeasurable one that it is not in effect an uncertainty at all. We ... accordingly 
restrict the term ‘uncertainty’ to cases of the non-quantative type.”  
2.1 Uncertainty and Risk 
According to Knight (1921), risk involves contractual situations in which many known alternative 
scenarios could potentially emerge during the life of the contract (Brousseau & Glachant, 2002). The 
important distinction here is that it is possible to avoid post-contractual re-negotiation, as variances can 
be stipulated in the contract. Therefore, it is possible to sign “flexible” contracts or “framework 
agreements”, which provide for a range of alternative scenarios. For instance, the exact quantity of 
products required over the life of the contract may not be known, and a potential disturbance may relate 
to changing input costs. In this case, a contract can include “escalator” clauses, which establish a link 
between contract prices and input cost indices. Although the exact nature of a possible disturbance 
cannot be predicted in circumstances of risk, it is possible to anticipate the range of variations and build 
this into the contract. However, uncertainty causes problems for relationships. Knight (1921) defined 
uncertainty as occurring in contractual situations that involve unimaginable scenarios that could emerge 
over the life of the contract. Therefore, uncertainty means there is an incomplete contract at the start of 
the relationship. According to Lonsdale (2005), uncertainty is significant because the inability to sign 
complete contracts makes it difficult for buyers to obtain value for money.  
2.2 Origins of Uncertainty 
There are several different origins and types of uncertainty. From the perspective of transaction cost 
economics, uncertainty is often viewed as one of the main counter-arguments when deciding whether to 
move from in-house governance to an external party (Williamson, 1985). Transaction cost analysis 
(TCA) considers the firm as having a governance structure rather than a production function 
(Williamson, 1979, 1985). TCA emphasises minimising both production and transaction costs by 
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deciding on an appropriate governance structure that either handles the activity within the firm or by 
market function (Williamson, 1979, p. 245, 1985, 2008). Transaction costs arise when there is a need to 
allocate resources to organise transactions between parties (Johanson & Mattsson, 1987). Williamson 
(1991, 2008) defined three ways in which transactions can be organised: market, hierarchy (that is, 
handling the activity within the firm), or hybrid. The hybrid form is a bilateral mode between hierarchy 
and market that is characterised by various forms of strategic alliance agreements between buyer and 
seller (Williamson, 1991). 
From a transaction cost perspective, Williamson (1985) divided uncertainty into two types: one is 
state-contingent and the other is related to behavioural uncertainty. The latter is based on assumptions 
of bounded rationality and opportunism and, according to the literature, may be linked to some of the 
main problems associated with outsourcing and sourcing (cf. Walker, 1998). Bounded rationality limits 
the opportunity to write complete contracts; that is, contracts that fully explain transactions given all 
future possibilities. Opportunism implies self-interest and guile and it can be difficult to know who can 
be trusted (Williamson, 1985). Opportunism and bounded rationality give rise to information 
impactedness, which Williamson (1975, p. 31) referred to as information that is asymmetrically 
distributed between parties coupled with a high cost of enabling information symmetry. Williamson 
also stated that information impactedness becomes particularly relevant in the context of a 
small-numbers bargain. Similarly, Lonsdale (2001) argued that information asymmetry increases the 
risk of opportunism (for example, from an outsourcing perspective, the supplier often becomes more 
knowledgeable about outsourcing than the buyer). Williamson linked bounded rationality with 
uncertainty/complexity and opportunism with small-number exchange. Thus, information impactedness 
arises from uncertainty and opportunism.  
Under conditions of bounded rationality and opportunism, asset specificity and uncertainty come into 
play. Asset specificity causes one or both parties to become locked to the other. For instance, if a buyer 
makes a significant transaction-specific investment, it can only re-enter the market if it is willing to 
write that investment off at a significant loss. This can result in the buyer staying with a suboptimal 
supplier because the risk (financial, operational and perceived) of moving to an alternative supplier is 
too great. This becomes particularly problematic if the transaction is characterised by uncertainty. Thus, 
in-house governance is preferable when asset specificity is high, and low asset specificity implies that 
the relevant transactions should be handled by a market (that is, outsourcing) or hybrid forms (such as 
temporary strategic alliances) (Williamson, 1991).  
Firms often have difficulty estimating total costs because of their inadequate costing systems (McIvor, 
2000). All costs associated with buying, using, and maintaining an item, rather than just its purchase 
price, should be considered when evaluating that item (Ellram & Maltz, 1995). The measurement 
problem is linked, to some degree, to basic assumptions about human nature and what is referred to 
above as behavioural uncertainty. Without bounded rationality, there will be no measurement problem, 
since unbounded rationality implies that the measurement costs are zero (Williamson, 1985). If there is 
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no opportunism, there will be no measurement problems, since neither party attempts to exploit private 
information to the disadvantage of the other (ibid.).  
2.3 Types of Uncertainty 
Walker (1988) identified the two following types of uncertainty:  
1) Volume uncertainty raises costs when external contracting is used, and includes uncertainty about the 
estimation of volume or fluctuations. High volume uncertainty will lead a company to make a 
component rather than buy it. 
2) Technological uncertainty raises costs when using internal governance and includes a probability of 
future technological developments or changes in the specification of a component.  
Walker stated that volume uncertainty has been shown to raise transaction costs, while costs incurred 
due to technological uncertainty may be greater if production is in-house than if it has been outsourced. 
The opportunity for the buyer to shift the technological risks to suppliers depends on whether he or she 
has alternative suppliers to turn to and whether switching costs are low. Walker (1988) also mentioned 
three types of strategic risks related to supplier relationships: appropriation, technology diffusion, and 
end-product degradation risk. Appropriation is the risk that a supplier may take advantage of the 
customer’s dependence in order to increase his or her share of the resulting customer revenues. 
Diffusion is the danger that innovative products or process technology will be imitated. Product 
degradation is the risk that important product attributes will be distorted or impaired in distribution, 
marketing or technical service operations.  
All of these types of uncertainties are linked to the fact that the customer is becoming dependent on his 
or her supplier. According to Ouchi (1980), the absence of competition in situations with 
small-numbers bargaining will lead to each party opportunistically claiming higher costs or supplying 
poor quality. In order to sustain such a relationship, each party must incur the considerable expense of 
auditing the costs or performance of the other. Williamson (1975) also indicated that, due to bounded 
rationality, it is too expensive, or even impossible, for general management to evaluate everything 
going on at the operating level and adjust compensation accordingly.  
2.4 Management of Uncertainties 
There are several ways to mitigate or manage uncertainty. As mentioned above, uncertainty means that 
an incomplete contract is signed prior to its commencement, with the gaps filled in during the contract 
period. Post-contractual re-negotiation then becomes inevitable. However, negotiations about filling 
gaps can be difficult under conditions of opportunism. If one party has become locked in with no 
credible threat of exit, the re-negotiation of the contract is likely to be more problematic. The risk is 
that one party will try and hold the other up in order to earn quasi-rents (Lonsdale, 2005). 
Re-negotiation will not necessarily be a serious problem unless there is a power imbalance between the 
two parties or opportunism is prevalent in the relationship. If the stronger party chooses to act 
opportunistically and take advantage of its power resources, it will be able to earn rents from the 
transaction (Shelanski & Klien, 1995). According to Ellram and Edis (1996), firms can also consider 
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partnering when the market fluctuates between moderate and high uncertainty.  
Partnering is seen as an attempt to pre-empt opportunistic behaviour by highlighting the mutual 
advantages of working together in a long-term and on-going relationship (cf. Williamson, 1985). In 
accordance with this, there are a number of ways in which partnering such as joint ventures can help 
mitigate or manage uncertainty. Firstly, the inherent closeness of a partnership can support the quick 
(and complete) flow of necessary information between organisations and fill information gaps. 
Secondly, the trust developed in the relationship can ensure that negotiations over filling the 
information gaps occur without exploitation. When there is evidence of a relatively high degree of 
uncertainty, it is often suggested that partnering (or indeed hierarchy) is more appropriate as a 
governance structure than relying on market exchanges (Williamson, 1975, 1985). This is because it is 
not possible to effectively manage these relationships through classical or flexible (including 
“framework agreement”) contracts (Macneil, 1974). Therefore, moving to a closer relationship that 
involves sharing information, joint goals and the like will reduce the probability that either buyer or 
supplier will act opportunistically. Partnerships are also formed to create stability in response to 
environmental uncertainty, which is generated by resource scarcity and a lack of full knowledge of 
environmental fluctuations, the availability of suitable exchange partners and the rates of exchange. 
This uncertainty drives organisations to form long-term collaborative relationships in order to improve 
the stability, predictability, and dependability of their exchange relationships (Oliver, 1990).  
2.5 A Framework for Analysing Uncertainty in Outsourcing and LCC Sourcing 
Based on this literature review, we can isolate different types of uncertainties with some key origins. 
The literature more or less converges by considering uncertainty at a strategic level based on 
opportunistic behaviour, largely because buyers often end up in locked-in situations. A number of 
previous studies have addressed how to manage uncertainty, with a focus on contractual forms and 
relationship-building dimensions to avoid opportunism and competitive threats in the actual 
outsourcing or sourcing agreement. Using this view, the present article addresses uncertainty in terms 
of the origin, type and mitigation or management of uncertainty (see Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. A Conceptual Model for Analysing Uncertainty Based on Type, Origin and 
Management with Examples of Key Considerations 
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3. Method  
The empirical design of this article comprises three case studies of global sourcing from low-cost 
countries and three case studies of outsourcing to a non-developed supplier market in close proximity 
(see Table 1). The study draws on data collected through 28 interviews with management personnel 
involved in the sourcing and outsourcing decision making (see Table 1). 
In line with a case study methodology, the cases have been chosen for their potential to be interesting 
from both theoretical and empirical perspectives (Bengtsson et al., 1997; Yin, 2003; Voss, 2002). 
Accordingly, we chose our cases for their potential ability to offer observations that could add to the 
theoretical discussion presented in this article. We chose to focus on Scandinavian companies engaged 
in LCC sourcing or outsourcing of semi-manufactured goods from local markets and Asia, specifically 
China and India. 
There are variations in terms of company size, sectors, and the stages of outsourcing/LCC sourcing that 
the case companies have reached. With the assistance of discussions with industry experts, we selected 
companies with varying characteristics because this made it easier to capture different views of 
uncertainty and increased the generalisability of the results (Yin, 2003). The interview guide was sent 
to the respondents before the actual interviews. The interviews were recorded and subsequently 
transcribed into longer case descriptions. The descriptions were sent to the case companies, which 
helped us increase the construct validity (Ellram, 1996; Yin, 2003; Voss, 2002). The respondents 
supplied additional information and, in some cases, identified a few minor corrections to the case 
descriptions, which further improved the data validation (Yin, 2003). Within-case, cross-case analysis, 
as well as comparison with literature, started at the same time as the data collection (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Voss, 2002; Yin, 2003). 
 
Table 1. Overview of Case Companies Studied and Data Collected 
Case Situation Interviewees 
Case A Outsourcing to a non-developed supplier market in close proximity Group director, CEO, production manager and project manager 
Case B Outsourcing to a non-developed supplier market in close proximity CEO and purchasing director 
Case C Outsourcing to a non-developed supplier market in close proximity Group director 
Case D Global sourcing from low-cost countries Purchasing manager 
Case E Global sourcing from low-cost countries Purchasing director, vice president of purchasing, logistics manager
Case F Global sourcing from low-cost countries Purchasing manager 
 
4. Case Studies 
This section presents six case descriptions that illustrate outsourcing to a supplier market that is in close 
proximity, but is non-developed (Cases A-C) and LCC sourcing (Cases D-F).  
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4.1 Case A 
This company, which is one of Europe’s largest producers of wooden windows, entered an agreement 
with an international forestry product company to outsource window blanks (a wood component used 
for manufacturing window frames). The supplier made a greenfield investment and built a new plant to 
manufacture these components that was directly integrated with the current production of sawn wood. 
As part of this investment, the supplier installed new production technology that included 
finger-jointing, which helped to lower both labour and raw material costs. The outsourcing company 
guaranteed certain volumes and supported the supplier in its development (for example, quality 
standards, production process flow and developing different operational functions). Even though the 
company selected a large outsourcing partner with scale and financial stability, the outsourcing of the 
blanks encountered several initial problems, due to the supplier’s lack of experience in handling this 
type of component manufacturing. The company also experienced insufficient communication from the 
supplier when it was experiencing production stops, troubles or delays in the manufacturing. The group 
director described this issue as follows: 
“The quality varies too much. The sawmills have historically not shown the capability or 
understanding to deliver high quality with little variation. If you cannot manage that you should not try 
to make industrial components.” (Group director) 
Such quality issues forced the company to initiate costly additional in-house activities to repair the 
blanks, which often become so expensive that they rendered the cost reduction of the outsourcing 
redundant. As supply uncertainty continued, the company decided to change its outsourcing strategy to 
instead increase in-house capacity. This was done primarily to ensure reliability in supplies, as the 
blanks are the first input to window production, and high supply reliability of components with 
sufficient quality is critical in order to avoid production interruptions As the CEO of the company said: 
“Blanks are a key product for us. They are one of the most critical products [in our production] and we 
need to secure [the flow of this component] to be able to continue to grow. We soon realised that we 
needed to keep the knowledge in-house and secure some volumes in order to not end up being too 
dependent on one source.” (CEO) 
Thus, the company again became a large producer of the wood component. This parallel production 
(partly in-house production and partly outsourced) offered high flexibility regarding volumes and also 
avoided costly investments in capacity expansion. This protected the group from becoming overly 
dependent on one supplier. 
4.2 Case B 
The company is a leading international manufacturer in the wood parquet flooring industry and exports 
to over 40 countries. The company has historically handled all of its activities in-house, including its 
own upstream manufacturing. As a result, it has experienced high costs and capital intensity and has 
aimed to find a better way of following market development; this resulted in a larger outsourcing 
strategy for the mid- and bottom-layer (M/B-components) of the wood parquet floor. 
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When rolling out the outsourcing strategy, the company had difficulty finding developed suppliers. This 
situation was different to that in most other industries, which often outsource to established specialist 
suppliers that may be larger than the outsourcing company. The company’s CEO described the 
difficulty as follows: 
“The problem is that there is no supplier structure [compared to the car and high tech/IT industries]. 
These strong [developed] suppliers do not exist… joinery factories work with much more expensive 
products so they are not on the cards… then there are sawmills that often lack everything… The best 
[sawmills] have a saw or planing machines… The first thing they cannot manage is the drying 
process.” (CEO) 
As a result of not finding developed suppliers, the company revised its strategy to instead focus on 
outsourcing volumes of non-standard components produced from less efficient production lines. This 
decision was linked to the various efficiency levels of the five production plants that manufacture the 
M/B-components: three lines in one larger plant (one very rational and the other two had the potential 
for streamlining) and two less rational lines at the other two production sites. The CEO stated that the 
company can outsource non-standard components for a slightly higher cost than using its most efficient 
line because it still saves money compared to in-house production (for example, by outsourcing 
components manufactured during a night shift at one of the less efficient plants). In this way, the 
company could outsource this production while keeping most of the standard and cost-efficient 
M/B-component manufacturing in-house, thereby avoiding making new investments in non-core 
activities. As the purchasing director explained: 
“The thought is that we should build up a part [i.e., a supplier] to complement [our current 
production].” (Purchasing director) 
4.3 Case C 
This company is one of the largest wooden door manufacturers in Europe and the leading supplier of 
internal and external door solutions in the Nordic region, Germany, and Austria; these areas represent 
about 90 percent of the company’s sales. Areas that are central for the company are control over 
process costs and becoming more “lean”. Since becoming a supplier to IKEA, the company has 
maintained a strong focus on cost. This main driving force for the company’s outsourcing is related to 
the difficulty of making large profits. Therefore, the company focuses very closely on expenses and 
whether its own production units are profitable. Process excellence becomes a clear driver for 
outsourcing to benchmark internal cost effectiveness with the effectiveness of external suppliers. This 
point show how much each component costs, both in-house and externally. The group director 
described the strategy as follows:  
“We must always be able to see how much this component costs in-house and what it costs externally… 
One rule of thumb is that we consider outsourcing when the price of a supplier is lower than the 
internal cost price plus 25 percent.” (Group director) 
The company bases its outsourcing decisions on whether it has firm control of its total internal costs. If 
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it finds that an external supplier can handle an internal activity at a lower cost and the process 
development seems difficult, the company will consider buying rather than making. However, the 
opposite also applies: if the company initialises the outsourcing of components to a supplier that later 
fails to offer competitive prices or increases prices, the company will consider in-sourcing the activity. 
This situation suggests that the need for efficiency and productivity development is being increasingly 
pushed onto suppliers. However, because a secure supply line is critical for the company, it is 
sometimes better, when outsourcing, to guarantee security and sufficient production scale to handle 
deliveries of components to several production centres, especially when the company is working 
towards building its doors on similar modules. This means that even though cost efficiency is a central 
focus, the company does not always select the cheapest supplier. In line with increasing the outsourcing 
of components, the company works to reduce its supplier base to the main supplier. A typical demand is 
that the supplier must have the scale to deliver to several plants, but it also works hard to reduce the 
number of components and suppliers. 
The group director argued that some local suppliers can handle wood component manufacturing, 
although they usually need help to develop their competencies. To cope with these issues, the company 
has created special teams that help suppliers with operation-related problems. In addition, the teams can 
help with starting up new technology and logistical issues. The teams facilitate the start-up and 
integration of the outsourced components with the company’s production, and maintain competence in 
wood component manufacturing within the firm.  
4.4 Case D 
The company is part of a large multinational company and is a second-tier supplier of components for 
the automotive and industrial products sector. There is a strong corporate directive to rationalise 
purchasing and source from LCCs as a means of introducing competition into the existing supply base. 
Customers have also pressured the company into sourcing from LCCs as part of the continual 
improvement of cost competitiveness.  
Consequently, the company has initiated an LCC sourcing programme for simple components, 
primarily those with no design changes and standard specifications. Sourced from Asia, these are 
generally metal products that are later moulded into rubber parts. The metal parts constitute a large part 
of the output of the company’s final product—sometimes up to 70-80 percent of the total end product. 
There is not much sourcing from Eastern Europe, with a greater focus on India, Taiwan and China. 
Divisions of the parent (especially the automotive group) are active in India and Taiwan and they help 
to source from these countries.  
The purchasing department is convinced that sourcing from LCCs offers savings. The purchasing target 
aims for a total cost reduction of at least 30 percent, although there is also an awareness that the lack of 
closeness to suppliers can be a problem when it comes to research and development, where close 
coordination is necessary.  
One challenge in handling global sourcing involves material specification. Because of material 
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standard differences across various countries, foreign suppliers may produce products that do not 
conform to the necessary standards. Technical development and manufacturing lead time are very 
similar to those of suppliers in Europe. Compared to geographically close suppliers, more time is lost in 
setting up transportation than in developing components. There are also challenges due to the cultural 
differences between the companies’ business practices. Another problem area is time delivery reliability, 
and the accuracy of information handling needs significant improvement. Supplier evaluation has 
become a key risk management area for the company.  
The handle supplier uncertainties, the product selection is made internally, but supplier selection and 
logistics coordination with suppliers occurs through other corporate divisions present in the LCCs 
themselves. While LCC sourcing is sometimes performed by agents, the company has plans to set up 
an international purchasing office. The company claims that it requires large amounts of stock when 
sourcing from Asia and demand planning does not happen in collaboration with the customer. 
4.5 Case E 
The company is a global market leader in on-road load handling solutions, with a complete product 
offering for loading and delivering goods. Its product range covers 80 percent of professional needs for 
mobile load handling. The company has salespeople and representative offices in 25 countries, and has 
over 100 distribution partners around the world. Its market is particularly strong in countries that have 
high labour costs.  
While the primary motive for purchasing globally is cost reduction, this is not only a question of price; 
it also involves standardisation to reduce variability in demand. LCC sourcing is used as a way to 
introduce competition into the existing supply base. Customers have also pressured the company into 
sourcing from LCCs as part of the continual improvement of cost competitiveness. Most of the sourced 
components are commodity products, such as cylinders (which represent a major part of the sourcing 
programme). The fact that there are few developed global suppliers for cylinders has led the company 
to scan markets in Eastern Europe, China and India.  
The challenging nature of finding quality suppliers, combined with the very high job turnover of 
purchasing agents, may cause difficulties for an LCC purchasing strategy. Another challenge is the 
difference in establishing technical perspectives between countries (establishing technical and other 
requirements takes a lot of time), which slows the decision-making process. Communication with 
suppliers can also become a challenge when sourcing from LCC. Therefore, a number of different 
aspects are considered when global sourcing is analysed. At a corporate level, discussions concern 
whether components should be produced in-house (considering points such as financial issues, position 
in the value chain, etc.) and whether production should be global. Global sourcing is conducted in two 
steps. The first step is to build up suppliers for Asian production, while the second step is to use Asian 
suppliers to supply European factories. It also takes time to set up a new system, but when everything is 
running smoothly the perception at the company is that there should be no additional problems with 
supplies from China, for example. 
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In the case of new products, there is a high risk of failure when sourcing from low-cost countries, 
which means that sourcing is generally done in close proximity. The failure of one project for a specific 
line can cause the programme to stop for approximately two years. The company is continually looking 
for new suppliers, while also trying to keep the number of suppliers in low-cost regions as small as 
possible. This strategy is intended to result in higher volumes, and it makes it easier to follow and 
monitor suppliers. However, a change in suppliers is a significant adjustment and requires a lot of 
change management (although this is no different from a change of suppliers locally or within Europe). 
According to the company, the key is to change suppliers but not geographical regions. European 
suppliers are retained, which means there is a back door if something dramatic disturbs deliveries from 
Asia. 
4.6 Case F 
The company is a first-tier OEM manufacturer. Within its industry, the company has been a pioneer in 
sourcing from LCC. It has long-established procedures for managing sourcing and logistics activities 
and has been successful at LCC sourcing activities. The company is convinced of the potential cost 
reduction in LCC sourcing for its corporate global operations, and is also motivated by the market 
presence perspective.  
Sourcing has gradually focused towards India, where the company has established an international 
purchasing office that has a clear understanding of the purchasing and logistics requirements of its 
various global facilities through cross-functional and cross-locational efforts in decision-making.  
The first phase of sourcing starts with simple, time-insensitive, low-volume, constant-demand and 
less-complex products, and later moves on to high-volume, constant-demand products. These initial 
stages allow the company to understand supplier quality level and simultaneously set up logistics 
capabilities for sustainable LCC sourcing. The company avoids bulk low-value, non-stackable products, 
even if they have a substantially lower unit cost, and it also avoids low-volume products because of 
increased logistics coordination costs. During the sourcing process, the company comes to understand 
the technical capability of the suppliers and the feasibility of the purchase. It shares detailed volume 
plans with its suppliers and simultaneously with third-party logistics (TPL) providers. Once the 
technical capability of a supplier has been proven and established, the TPL company coordinates the 
demand planning information and material from the supplier to the company’s individual global 
factories. Challenges include reduced flexibility to demand fluctuations, cultural problems, inland 
transportation infrastructure, handling, special packaging requirements and warehousing space 
requirements. There is high internal resistance to sourcing from LCCs since the company is a tier 1 
supplier, and the logistics capabilities are perceived to be difficult to judge internally. 
The company does not experience a great deal of difference between its suppliers in Europe and its 
selected suppliers in India. Despite some initial problems resulting from having new people and 
systems, fewer issues arose after one or two successful cycles. For instance, one supplier supplies eight 
different plants, and some of the potential problems are related to the very-low-volume parts. The 
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purchasing manager described the situation as follows: 
“When you start, many issues come up, but once there is a flow in the products there are not many 
issues with logistics and quality.” (Purchasing manager) 
The company does not consider that there is a large risk of an increase in price, since there are a limited 
number of suppliers to cater for the demand. Prices are maintained at the same level because suppliers 
know that they cannot really hedge more with the OEM; however, it will be more of a capacity issue. 
The requirements are clear, and as long as the suppliers are cheap and capable of providing what is 
required in terms of quality, safety and environment issues, they will get the business. If a cheaper 
supplier appears in Europe, the entire sourcing process will take a new turn. According to the company, 
however, low cost is no longer the only issue, now that some of the LCC suppliers are world-class 
(having won Deming Awards and/or QS, TS or ISO standards). Some of the company’s suppliers sell to 
customers around the world, which consistently rate the company as their best suppliers. A new 
challenge, however, is the fact that India has few such world-class suppliers, although these are slowly 
developing. Consequently, the company has focused on finding and building supplier quality capability. 
However, large suppliers are busy and in demand from many companies, including large firms such as 
Ford, GM and Toyota. Supplier management is also an issue. A few medium-level suppliers are useful 
for local production, but for the export market the company must spend a lot of time with suppliers that 
have not been exposed to global competition.  
 
5. Discussion 
In the cases studied, we observed three types of uncertainty: operational, behavioural and measurement. 
The outsourcing cases studied (Cases A-C) are particularly concerned with operational issues related to 
the security of supply (this may involve questions about reliability, product quality or sufficient 
volumes). These firms suffer from not having a developed intermediary industry for component 
manufacturing outsourcing that is positioned between them and the raw material suppliers. As a 
consequence, these case companies focus on evaluating component vulnerability and supplier 
capability when considering outsourcing strategies. This is important given that much of the existing 
outsourcing literature (Williamson, 1975, 1985) has been based on transaction cost analysis and has 
therefore taken a structural/strategic view of the outsourcing phenomenon rather than focusing on 
operational uncertainties. Not surprisingly, operational uncertainty for the global LCC cases studied can 
be linked to the sourcing distance (demand planning) and measurement uncertainty (such as material 
specification).  
End-product degradation (that is, degradation of product quality) can also be linked to behavioural 
uncertainties, which are experience by both the outsourcing firms and the global LCC sourcing firms. 
Quality is critical for outsourced and sourced components and inappropriate material, and tolerances or 
quality can cause costly extra activities or even production interruptions. Components that are 
considered for outsourcing and sourcing are mostly decomposable and do not create dependency for 
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knowledge (cf. Fine & Whitney, 1999). This finding is in line with earlier studies that the difficulty of 
materialising extensive savings in LCC sourcing for highly customised products (Horn et al., 2013). 
The risk of becoming dependent on the supplier may be caused by a number of factors, including 
limited supplier market, and may result in suppliers acting opportunistically (Williamson, 1975, 1985; 
Lonsdale & Cox, 1997). This applies to both the global LCC sourcing firms and the outsourcing firms, 
but in different ways. While only a few suppliers are available for the global LCC sourcing firms, these 
suppliers are directly capable of shouldering a supplier role, to varying degrees. This places the focus 
on supplier evaluation, and our case studies show that this might even require the sourcing company to 
maintain a local presence. The strategy of the LCC sourcing firms can be linked to what Najafi et al. 
(2013) termed a transactional approach, with a greater focus on purchasing than on supply market 
development. 
Outsourcing firms do not necessarily have any available suppliers that can directly take over the 
manufacturing of the outsourced component. One key problem is a lack of suppliers that have sufficient 
scale in component manufacturing as well as developed capabilities. This situation creates the risk of 
involving small-numbers bargaining (cf. Williamson, 1985) and is enhanced by a measurement 
uncertainty. The relatively limited experience of the potential suppliers’ in terms of managing 
component manufacturing complicates outsourcing and increases the uncertainty of the suppliers’ price 
estimate. In the absence of a developed supplier market, it is difficult to access external suppliers’ costs 
and prices in order to compare them with internal costs. This results in uncertainties, increased risks, 
higher costs and decreased performance. Therefore, the limited supplier market may not only run the 
risk of becoming dependent on the suppliers (cf. Lonsdale & Cox, 1997), but also in the need to 
develop the suppliers or consider alternative sourcing strategies.  
Developing the suppliers means that operational uncertainties will be reduced, but dependence—and 
therefore behavioural uncertainties—will increase. In line with the findings of Horn et al. (2013), the 
global sourcing firms that we studied managed this by sourcing commodity types of materials using 
multiple large safety stocks or suppliers in order to reduce operational uncertainties and behavioural 
uncertainties/dependence. There is a basic assumption that supplier uncertainties are reduced by 
collaborating with a large firm that is assumed to have the competence and/or resources needed to 
develop products and processes. This can be related to the outsourcing firms studied, which are more 
reluctant to initialise full-scale outsourcing when the perceived risks cannot be managed in a controlled 
manner (cf. Ellram et al., 2008). These firms have used a variety of measures to handle this situation. 
All three firms have maintained some in-house production, which enables them to in-source if required, 
to retain competence and to compare in-house costs with supplier prices. We have encountered three 
different ways of handling supplier uncertainty in outsourcing by maintaining some in-house 
production.  
1) The first way (Case A) is to maintain in-house production for security and as an external capacity 
regulator to manage market cyclicality. In this way, a mixed strategy is also used as a financial 
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incentive, which gives the firm a call option if the supplier fails and helps avoid opportunistic 
behaviour.  
2) The second method (Case B) is to develop large-scale in-house production systems while also 
outsourcing non-standard components that do not fit the in-house production setup. In all large-scale 
production systems, some products will be more costly to produce in-house than others; these can be 
better managed in an outsourcing agreement. 
3) The third approach (Case C) is to proactively develop the supplier base while maintaining in-house 
production to develop competence and measure own performance and supplier price/cost. Here, 
competence is transferred to suppliers in order to streamline the production process and allow goods to 
flow. In-house expert teams handle this development.  
This can be compared with the global LCC sourcing firms (Cases D-F), which manage operational 
uncertainties using safety stocks, to ensure low prices and larger volumes (sourcing commodities). In 
addition, they also use another type of mixed strategy in which they keep domestic suppliers (for new 
products, for example) while also sourcing from LCC suppliers or from multiple LCC countries.  
 
6. Conclusions  
The present article has shown that not all contexts have developed supplier markets for directly 
managing outsourcing or sourcing. In line with authors such as Horn et al. (2013) and Najafi et al. 
(2013), we have addressed issues that may arise when outsourcing or conducting global LCC sourcing. 
We have also added to the understanding of uncertainty in terms of type, origin and mitigation or 
management. In particular, we have found that sourcing to emerging LCC suppliers and outsourcing to 
suppliers in close proximity results in similar issues. Specifically, suppliers often do not have long-term 
experience of the operations they run or take over. Many of the uncertainties in the studied outsourcing 
situations stem from the shift from a set of “knowns” in the company’s environment to a set of 
“unknowns” involving a new supplier setting. This article has shown examples of uncertainty in which 
the difficulty has occurred in terms of finding outsourcing suppliers that have both capacity and 
competencies. Similar issues have arisen in low-cost country sourcing situations where there is a need 
to plan the location of production as well as to develop supplier capacity and capabilities. Such 
transformation may be a consequence of a more dynamic global marketplace in which competition and 
customer and supplier markets are constantly changing, and may lead to new uncertainties (Horn et al., 
2013). Figure 2 presents the uncertainties observed in our case. 
 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/mmse            Modern Management Science & Engineering               Vol. 3, No. 1, 2015 
16 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
 
Figure 2. Management of Uncertainty in Outsourcing and LCC Sourcing Situations 
 
As Figure 2 shows, operational uncertainties come into particular focus in outsourcing or sourcing in 
the absence of any well-functioning supplier market. This finding contrasts with earlier literature, 
which tended to handle uncertainties based on opportunistic behaviour such as uncertainty originating 
from dependency and access to information, largely because buyers end up in lock-in situations. Much 
of this literature is based on Williamson (1985) and therefore takes a structural/strategic view instead of 
one based on operational issues.  
Operational aspects originating from uncertainty of the supplier capability are critical, but can be 
mitigated by a number of different mechanisms related to logistics, supplier and purchasing 
management. This article has shown that such mitigating mechanisms include issues such as proactive 
supplier evaluation, the need for larger buffers, and development of the supplier base, as well as a 
mixed strategy, in which parallel production is continued in-house whilst also sourcing. A mixed 
strategy can help firms, particularly outsourcing firms, better manage the reversibility of the decision 
and avoid divesting all capability to perform an activity at later stage (cf. Mols, 2010); this helps lower 
switching costs when there is uncertainty about supplier performance. It can also help when conducting 
continuous cost benchmarking. In this view, a mixed strategy can also help to cope with behavioural 
and measurement uncertainties, as it serves to increase contracting flexibility and improve supplier 
market transparency (that is, cost competiveness).  
For practitioners, the present study indicates the importance of conducting a thorough analysis of the 
uncertainties of an outsourcing or sourcing situation, and of considering supplier capability. While 
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outsourcing and LCC sourcing decisions are undoubtedly complex and require thorough analysis, it 
appears as though this process must be even more comprehensive in non-developed or emerging 
supplier markets. Such markets seem to result in uncertainties regarding costs and performance, which 
shifts the focus to analysing the vulnerability of the component/sub-system alongside supplier market 
evaluation (for example, the number of suppliers and their development). It is important to consider 
this aspect because even a supplier that has sufficient production scale and financial possibilities may 
have difficulty handling certain outsourcing or sourcing due to a lack of competence and experience. 
This article finds that mixed strategies, in which parallel production is continued in-house whilst also 
outsourcing, are a way of managing multiples of uncertainties. 
Future research should continue to investigate how to mitigate or manage the operational day-to-day 
uncertainties with the long-term strategy of a company, especially when it comes to uncertainties 
related to supplier selection and sourcing in non-developed and emerging supplier markets. There is 
also a need for more research into what alternative strategies are available. One such alternative 
discussed here is a mixed strategy in which parallel production is continued in-house whilst also 
outsourcing parts of the production. 
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